I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post e¢ cient equilibrium without assuming di¤erentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of (potentially) asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights the economic content of what it takes to obtain e¢ cient ex post equilibria.
Introduction
This paper gives a minimal set of assumptions that ensures existence of an e¢ cient ex-post equilibrium (once signals are known, players don't want to change their behavior), in asymmetric English auctions. I introduce a new assumption that I call Own E¤ect Property, and a new method to …nd equilibria, that does not require the ubiquitous assumptions that value functions are di¤erentiable I thank Federico Echenique and Alejandro Manelli for their comments. This paper started as an attempt to weaken some of the assumptions in their paper Echenique and Manelli (2006) on comparative statics. This paper owes them a lot: the main property of this paper is a weak version of their Dominant E¤ect Property, and the method of proof that I use was …rst used in an earlier version of their paper.
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Email: dubraj@um.edu.uy and jdubra@utdt.edu and that signals are drawn from a density. Moreover, the Own E¤ect Property is weaker than all the versions of the single crossing property that have been used in this branch of the literature.
The contribution of this paper is important because the English auction has had a prominent role in allocating objects among a potential set of buyers, both in real life, and in economic theory.
The English was the …rst auction format, having been used since the times of the Roman empire, and it is the most commonly used form of auction to sell goods nowadays (see McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Cassady (1967) who claims that 75% or more of all auctions are English). Its popularity stems from a variety of reasons: it yields more revenue than the other common auction format, the sealed bid, in a variety of contexts (see Milgrom (1989) and Milgrom and Weber, 1982) ; it allocates the object e¢ ciently in a wider range of environments; and it economizes on information gathering and bid preparation costs (see Milgrom, 1989) . Also, relative to other theoretical constructions of reduced use in the real world, like the second-price auction, it does not require the winner to reveal his true valuation, thus avoiding renegotiation between the seller and the highest bidder and also avoiding any con ‡ict that could happen if (for example) in a second-price auction the price paid is
signi…cantly less than what the winning bidder stated he was willing to pay. They go on to argue that this excessive amount of information gathering may make bidders collect less relevant information about the actual state of the world, leading to an ine¢ cient allocation of the object.
To summarize, I present a simple assumption of payo¤ functions that is weaker than all the assumptions of its kind, that ensures the existence of an e¢ cient ex-post equilibrium in the Asymmetric English Auction, when one assumes that valuations are non decreasing. This new assumption allows us to work with valuations that are not di¤erentiable, and with types which are not drawn from densities. The method of proof, …rst presented in Echenique and Manelli (2006) , is new and highlights the economic content of the assumptions that ensure e¢ ciency in this kind of auctions.
This contribution is relevant, because English auctions have played a prominent role in real life, and in economic theory.
I will now present the model, the assumptions and the results. I postpone the discussion of the literature until Section 3, because it needs a series of de…nitions. It su¢ ces here to say that the paper most related to this is Krishna (2003) . Although he uses di¤erentiability, densities, and two single crossing conditions that are stronger than the one in this paper, his set of su¢ cient conditions for the existence of e¢ cient ex-post equilibria in Asymmetric English Auctions does not imply my assumptions, since I assume that when some player's valuations are tied, valuations are weakly increasing in other players' signals. This assumption is neither weaker nor stronger than his assumption that one signal's increase causes the sum of valuations to increase.
The Model and Main Results
Let N = f1; 2:::; ng be the set of players. player) into real numbers, and that is strictly increasing in its own signal, so that for all i and all
For any s; let W (s) be the set of players i such that v i (s) v k (s) for all k (the set of "winners" at s). Let jW (s)j be the cardinality of W (s) : I now introduce the two conditions that are su¢ cient for the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium.
De…nition. The set of functions v is Increasing at Ties if for every s such that jW (s)j > 1 and
The interpretation of the above property is as follows. Suppose s is a pro…le of signals for which at least two players have equal and highest valuations. Then, the property requires that if one of the winner's signal increases to s 0 i ; then the e¤ect of the other player's signals, when they increase from s i to s 0 i ; does not hurt player i: Example 6 of Maskin (2001) shows that even if some sort of single crossing property is satis…ed, one still needs that player j's signal does not a¤ect player i's valuation "very" negatively, if an e¢ cient equilibrium is to exist (an equilibrium is e¢ cient if it always allocates the object to one of the players with the highest valuation). Valuations in Maskin's example are not Increasing at Ties, and that is why he …nds that no e¢ cient equilibrium exists. This property is neither weaker nor stronger than Krishna's assumption that when i's signal increases, the sum of all player's valuations increases.
I now turn to the more substantial assumption on valuations.
De…nition. The set of functions v satis…es the Own E¤ ect Property (OEP) if for every s such that jW (s)j > 1 it happens that
It states that the e¤ect of an increase in some signals is larger for one of the players whose signal increased than for all the rest of the players. Notice that it is a form of single crossing: if there are only two players, j's valuation is equal to k's and j's signal increases, j's valuation is larger than k's. As will be shown later, it is the weakest form of "single crossing" that has been used in this branch of the literature.
This paper is concerned with the irrevocable exit English Auction introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982) . In this game the auctioneer continuously raises the asking price, starting from zero. A bidder has the option of quitting the auction publicly at any time, and once he quits, he cannot reenter. The winner is the last bidder to remain in the auction, and he pays the price called when the last player (other than him) left the auction. In this game, a strategy for a player is a function that determines a price at which to quit, for each realization of the private information, and each history of who left the auction at what price. Formally, a strategy for bidder i is a collection of functions, one for each set of (active) players A and each pro…le p N nA of prices at which bidders in N nA quit the auction,
The value A i s i ; p N nA is the price at which bidder i will drop out if players in N nA dropped at prices p N nA and nobody quits before. As long as p < A i s i ; p N nA he stays in the auction; he drops out when p = A i s i ; p N nA ; in any history in which p > A i s i ; p N nA he drops out (this part of the strategy will never be used). The following is the main result of this paper. 
Necessity
I will show that, if one assumes a certain regularity condition on the valuations, then the OEP is necessary for existence of e¢ cient equilibria in undominated strategies.
So far we have said that an equilibrium is e¢ cient if it allocates the object to one of the players with the highest valuation for all pro…les of signals. This de…nition of e¢ ciency is the most demanding if one is concerned with …nding su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium. But one could also use another de…nition of e¢ ciency which is more demanding for necessity, and less so for su¢ ciency. Let us say that if an equilibrium of the English auction (with valuations v and distribution of signals ) assigns the object to the highest bidder with probability 1 it is e¢ cient.
Suppose now that we want to prove a theorem like "If property P of the pro…le of valuations v is violated, then there is no e¢ cient equilibrium for any :" There is no hope for such a Theorem, because if we assume v i (0) = 0 for all i and set (0) = 1; then any strategy pro…le that has N i (0; ;) = 0 (all players quit at p = 0; when all players are active, if they have a signal of 0) is a e¢ cient equilibrium. Hence, the statement of the would-be theorem should be "If property P of the pro…le of valuations v is violated, then there is a such that no e¢ cient equilibrium exists."
I say that the set of functions v is regular if each v i is twice di¤erentiable and for all s with jW (s)j > 1 the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of subsets of the winners is invertible, or more formally, for all P W (s) ;
is invertible.
I now show that in the presence of the regularity assumption above, the OEP is necessary.
For simplicity, and because the focus of this paper is precisely to get rid of the di¤erentiability assumptions, I present the result for only three players. 1 With more players the arguments are more involved, but the result is still true. I also assume that if two or more players quit at the same price, the tie is broken assigning the object to each player with positive probability. 
The Literature
The OEP is inspired in, and closely related to, the following property used in Echenique and Manelli (2006) : v satis…es the Dominant E¤ ect Property if for any s 0 and s with some s 0 j > s j ;
The OEP is weaker than the DEP in …ve dimensions: on the domain of application, OEP applies more generally (i) OEP applies only when s 0 s; (ii) it applies only when jW (s)j > 1; (iii) it applies only when s 0 j > s j for players j in W (s) ; the conclusion (what is demanded of the functions) is weaker because (iv) the inequality in the conclusion is weak and (v) OEP does not require that the increments be larger (for players whose signals increase), but only that the …nal values be larger.
Of these weakenings of the condition in Echenique and Manelli, the only relevant one in terms of applicability of the property, is the weak inequality in the conclusion. Of course, sets of functions v that satisfy the OEP and not the DEP (for reasons other than the weak inequality) are easy to construct, but are not very relevant. 3 The strict inequality is di¤erent however, since it excludes, for example, simple variations of the common value auction in which one player's signal has the same e¤ect on his valuation than on some other players'. It is worth emphasizing that Echenique and Manelli (2006) is not a paper about auctions, but about comparative statics, so they have de…ned their DEP in order to yield comparative statics results in a wide variety of contexts, and not just auctions. Hence, it is not surprising that one can weaken their property when using it in a particular setting.
I now turn to the discussion of the most relevant papers and their assumptions.
The OEP is weaker than the Single Crossing property
As an illustration of the importance of the OEP assumption for auctions, we now show that it is weaker than the Single Crossing condition that I now introduce. Suppose there are two players; the functions v = (v 1 ; v 2 ) satisfy the Single Crossing Condition if at any s such that v 1 (s) = v 2 (s)
This is the version in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) . In Maskin (1992) the inequality is weak, but applies to all s: Since the Single Crossing is necessary for the existence of e¢ cient equilibria in two player auctions, the OEP is also necessary. 4 Moreover, in addition to being implied by the SC, the OEP does not require that the value functions v be di¤erentiable, as does the Single Crossing Condition.
Theorem 3. OEP is weaker than Single Crossing. Suppose that there are only two players, and that v 1 and v 2 are di¤ erentiable. If v satis…es the SC condition or the (Maskin) Single
Crossing, it satis…es the OEP.
Although this theorem is a consequence of the result in the next section (that the Average
Crossing Condition implies the OEP) I present a simple proof of the result.
Proof of Theorem 3. We will assume that the OEP does not hold, and show that this implies that the SC fails. Take any s 00 with jW (s 00 )j > 1 (i.e. v 1 (s 00 ) = v 2 (s 00 )) and an s 0 s 00 such that
We will now show that
and notice that " is well de…ned, since 0 belongs to the set over which the maximum is taken. If " = 1; there is nothing to prove, so suppose " < 1; and de…ne s = " s 0 + (1 " ) s 00 : We then
which contradicts the SC condition, and therefore proves that if SC holds, so does the OEP.
We will now show that if the Maskin Single Crossing holds, so does the OEP. As before, assume " < 1; so that
and de…ne s = " s 0 + (1 " ) s 00 which implies v 1 (s) = v 2 (s). This last equality and equation (1) contradict Maskin's Single Crossing since ;
as was to be shown. 4 Di¤erent versions of the statement "the single crossing is necessary for an e¢ cient equilibrium" can be found in Maskin (1992) , Birulin and Izmalkov (2003) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) .
The OEP, Average and Cyclical Crossing
In this section I show that the two properties used by Krishna (Average and Cyclical Crossing Conditions) imply an "equal increments"condition, which in turn implies the OEP. Therefore, this section shows the connection between both of Krishna's existence results.
For any P N; let I P denote the vector in R n with 1 in the jth coordinate i¤ j 2 P and 0 otherwise and let rv k denote the gradient of v k .
De…nition. The set of functions v satis…es:
(a) the Equal Increments Condition if for all P N there exists j 2 P such that for any s with jW (s)j > 1 and i = 2 P; I P rv j > I P rv i .
(b) Krishna's Average Crossing Condition (ACC) if for any s with jW (s)j > 1 and
holds at every s with jW (s)j > 1; where j + k (j + k) modulo n:
We now prove a simple Lemma that will help us show that both the Average Crossing Condition and the Cyclical Crossing Condition imply the OEP. The key to showing that these conditions imply the OEP is making the connection between the e¤ect of one signal on all valuations (as stated in the ACC and CCC) and the e¤ect of several signals on the valuations of two players.
Lemma A. If v satis…es the ACC or the CCC then it satis…es the Equal Increments Condition.
The previous Lemma asserts that when one increases the signals of a set of winners (by the same small amount) then the total growth of the valuation of one of the players whose signal increased is larger than the growth of any of those whose signals did not increase. This is just an arm's length away from the OEP. 
Birulin & Izmalkov
In this Section I show that the OEP is weaker than the assumptions used in Birulin and Izmalkov.
To do so, I …rst describe the equilibrium used in BI, and show that the existence of such an equilibrium (as implied by the assumptions in BI) implies the OEP.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the construction of an equilibrium with certain properties.
This kind of equilibrium was previously used in Milgrom and Weber (1982) , Maskin (1992) the process continues in this fashion.
The formal description of the strategies just mentioned is as follows: in a subgame in which types y N nA are known and active players are A;
Notice that since is continuous and weakly increasing, is strictly increasing and well de…ned.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the assumptions of BI are satis…ed. That is, s is drawn from a density, v's are twice di¤ erentiable, regular, rv j (s) 0 for all j and s; and satisfy the Generalized Single
Crossing: for any s with jW (s)j > 1 and any A W (s) ;
for all k 2 W (s) n A and any u such that u i > 0 for i 2 A and u j = 0 otherwise. Then, v satis…es the OEP.
The previous Theorem shows that Theorem 1 is indeed a generalization of Proposition 1 in Birulin and Izmalkov (2003): they assume di¤erentiability, densities, regularity, positive gradients and the GSC; I drop di¤erentiability, densities, regularity, valuations in this paper are only increasing at ties (and not rv j (s) 0 for all j and s), and the OEP is weaker than the GSC in the presence of the other assumptions. Moreover, as the next example shows, it would be "unfair" to compare just the GSC and the OEP, since the GSC is too weak a property in the absence of the other assumptions (in particular, regularity).
Example. GSC not su¢ cient in the absence of regularity. 
Appendix
The following Lemma proves the existence of a function as described in Section 3. 
holds;
(ii) for all p < p B y ; if y i < b then y N nB i (p) < b and the break even condition (2) hold;
(iii) for all p p B y ; and all k 2 N; v k y N nB (p) ; y N nB p:
The previous Lemma provides the basis for the existence of an ex-post and e¢ cient equilibrium.
The proof is based on a method …rst introduced in Echenique and Manelli, which does not require di¤erentiability of v; or the existence of a density for the distribution of types. Although this proof is more involved than theirs, beause it is based on a weaker property and does not use a border condition that they had assumed, the basic idea is the same.
The proof of Lemma 1 is based on the following Lemma. (which is independent of i) and let P be the set of nonempty subsets of that contain V
The set P has typical elements P and P 0 ; and each is a set of prices. Let Y = (P; ) : P 2 P, :
Notice that by condition (a) P = fp : p = v i (y) for some i 2 Ag 2 P is a singleton and the function de…ned by (v i (y)) = y A satis…es V y N nA i ( (p)) = p: Therefore, X is nonempty.
De…ning a partial order on X. De…ne a partial order on X by (P 0 ; 0 ) (P; ) if and only if
Showing that every chain in X has an upper bound. Take any totally ordered set in X (a chain) f(P ; )g in X and de…ne P [ P and :
any such that p 2 P : Notice that the de…nition of does not depend on the speci…c chosen, since if p belongs to two di¤erent P and P 0 ; we still get (p) = 0 (p) : I will …rst show that (P; ) 2 X; and then that (P; ) is an upper bound for f(P ; )g :
It is easy to check that is weakly increasing. Also, for any p 2 P; there is some for which:
p 2 P and (p) = (p) : Then, since (P ; ) 2 X; we get
showing that (P; ) 2 X:
To see that (P; ) is an upper bound, note that for any we have P P and (p) = (p)
for all p 2 P :
Showing that the maximal element implied by Zorn' s Lemma must have P = : Zorn's lemma then ensures that there exists a maximal element P M ; M in X: We now show that Case A, p = 2 P M : Consider …rst the case in which p = 2 P M : We set P 0 = P M [ fp g and letting fp n g be an increasing sequence in P M that converges to p ; de…ne 0 on P 0 through
Since M is increasing, the limit is well de…ned. Moreover, it is easy to check that 0 is increasing.
For all p 2 P M ; we already know that V
M (p) = p holds, and for p ; we also have that, by continuity of V
establishing that (P 0 ; 0 ) 2 X: Since (P 0 ; 0 ) P M ; M by construction, this contradicts P M ; M being maximal.
Case B, p 2 P M and 9p 2 P M such that p > p 0 : Consider now the case in which p 2 P M ; so that p < p 0 : If there is some p 2 P M such that p > p 0 ; one can follow the same steps as in Case A to discard the case in which p = 2 P M ; so assume that p 2 P M . Let s = (p ), and s = (p ) and …x any p with
Assume, without loss of generality, that s i > s i for all i (when they are equal, the signal of player i just becomes a …xed "parameter" in the V functions, and thus plays no role).
Let g : R ! ( 1; 1) be any strictly decreasing function with g (0) = 0: Let V 
The function
satis…es hypothesis of Brouwer, so there is a …xed point s f . We will now show that for all i;
1. Suppose that for some i; V 
Then, player k is such that V y N nA k s f > p; but since k 2 P s f ; s ; we must have s f k > s k and 
Case C, p 2 P M and @p 2 P M such that p > p 0 : Recall s = (p ) and …x any p with
The function h has a …xed point s f , so we will show that for all i; V 
Then, player k is such that V y N nA k s f > p; but since k 2 P s f ; s ; we must have s f k > s k and
s f < 0 which contradicts s f being a …xed point. 
So assume s 1 i < b for all i: Then, we have that 
In the limit p 1 ; s 1 we obtain for all i
and so, for some i; V i (s 1 ) = p 1 = V i b; s 1 i . Since V i is increasing in s i this means that s 1 i = b; so that we can set p A y = p 1 : This completes the proof of (i) and (ii). To establish (iii) set s 0 = y N nA (p) ; y N nA and s = y: If s 0 = s conditions (a) and (b) yield the desired result, so assume s 0 6 = s: Note that:
implies that k = 2 P (s 0 ; s) so that the OEP and P (s 0 ; s) A ensure
for all k = 2 A as was to be shown.
The previous Lemma establishes the existence of a function that maps prices into signals, the resulting pro…le of signals being the "presumption" that other players will have about a players' signal, if he quits at a certain price. The set A is the set of "active" players at a certain moment, and the pro…le of signals y is decomposed in the set of signals of inactive players y N nA and the set of signals such that all active players have signals greater than y A : Lemma 1 describes the presumption of other players about a certain player's signal, when he should have quit, but he didn't (in the sense that his presumed signal is b; but he didn't quit). The di¤erence with the previous Lemma is that we allow some elements of y B to be equal to b (whereas in Lemma 2 we had y B i < b for all i in B).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let B and y be as in the statement of this Lemma. Consider …rst the case in which y k < b for k = i; j 2 B; i 6 = j. De…ning A = Bn fj 2 B : y j = bg and applying Lemma 2 yields the desired result. So assume there is a unique i 2 B such that y i < b:
Then, it is easy to check that y N nB de…ned by
satis…es conditions (i) and (ii). To check condition (iii), two cases must be considered.
(I) If jW (y)j > 1; we have that for
and s = y, i = P (s 0 ; s) the OEP implies that for all p;
as was to be shown.
(II) If jW (y)j = 1; we have that for p = max j v j (y) = v i (y) ;
Suppose that contrary to what we want to show, there was some p such that for some j 6 = i
Given equations (6) and (7), continuity of y N nB (p) (ensured by construction) and Bolzano's Theorem, there exists a p such that
which contradicts (7), and therefore completes the proof.
The next Lemma gives the connection between one set of functions B and the set of functions A when A = Bn flg for some l 2 B: This gives the relation between the bidding strategies in a sub-auction with active players B; and the one that follows after player l has dropped out. If various players drop out at the same price, one only needs to apply the Lemma repeatedly at the price of the drops (e p in the Lemma). (i) z j p A z = b for some j with y j < b and for all i 2 A; p = p A y and y i < b imply the break even condition
(ii) for all p < p A z ; if y i < b then z i (p) < b and the break even condition (8) holds for all i 2 A.
(iii) for all p p A y ; and all k 2 N; v k y N nA (p) ; y N nA p:
Proof of Lemma 3. Items (i), (ii) and (iii) follow as a direct application of Lemma 1. Then, item (iv) follows because for all i; z i (e p) s A i ; and if z j (e p) > s A j we would get (using s 0 = s A j ; z j (p) ; z and s = s A ; z and that v is Increasing at Ties)
which is a contradiction.
We now show that the function is continuous.
Lemma 4. Continuity. For every A and y N nA satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1, the function y N nA is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that is discontinuous at p . It must be either not continuous from the right, or from the left, so assume without loss of generality that it is discontinuous from the left: there is an " such that for all there is some p with p p < but (p ) (p) " (we have used non decreasing). Fix then 1 = 1 and
Pick then, by induction, 0 < n < p p n 1 and p p n < n but (p ) (p n ) ": We then obtain: p n ! p ; p n is increasing, (p n ) is increasing and therefore has a limit (since its bounded above by b) s 1 and
Since for all n and for all i; V i ( (p n )) = p n we obtain by continuity of
But then, s 1 6 = (p ) and s 1 (p ) imply that for some i; s 1 i < i (p ). This, in turn, means that since V i is strictly increasing in s i and Increasing at ties (at s 1 all are tied),
This is a contradiction, and shows that is continuous.
Proof of Theorem 1. E¢ ciency. We will prove that the pro…le of strategies that in any auction with active players A and signals of inactive players y N nA calls for a player with signal s i to quit at a price
o , for as in Lemma 1, is an ex post equilibrium.
We will then show that it is also e¢ cient.
The …rst part of the proof (ex-post equilibrium) follows Krishna's Lemma 1 closely, but does not use the fact that is unique or strictly increasing. Consider bidder 1 and suppose that all bidders i > 1 are following the strategy i . We will now show that player 1 does not have a pro…table deviation.
Consider …rst the case in which following 1 player 1 wins when active players are A and signals are s: this can only happen if players in An f1g drop at the same price, say p : We will now show that he earns a pro…t, so that no deviations are pro…table: quitting before earns him 0; and he can never change the price he pays. Without loss of generality, let A = f2; 3; :::; ag : Since all strategies are increasing, all bidders in A can infer the signals s N nA of inactive bidders from the prices at which they dropped. Also, since player i = 2; :::; a drop at p and
which means that player 1 makes a pro…t, as was to be shown.
As a second alternative, consider the case in which 1 calls for bidder 1 to drop at some price p 1 in some sub-auction with active bidders A = f1; 2; :::; ag ; when the other players quit at signals s N nA , and suppose that bidder 1 considers staying longer until he wins the object. Suppose he stays until winning and that bidders quit in the order a; a 1; a 2; :::; 2 at prices p a :::; p 2 ; so that 1 wins at a price p 2 : We will show that by doing this he can't make a pro…t.
For p 2 , the price at which player 2 quits, s 2 = s N nf1;2g 2 (p 2 ) so (iii) of Lemma 1 implies that
Then, since for each …xed pair B; s N nB the function s N nB is increasing and when a bidder j 2 B drops out at p j , we get s N nB (p j ) = s N nfBnfjgg (p j ) (by (iv) of Lemma 3), we obtain
(p 4 ) :::
(the last equality follows from the fact that player 1 was supposed to quit at p 1 ). Equations (9) and (10) imply that p 2 v 1 (s) so that player 1 can't make a pro…t by staying longer than what his strategy calls for.
We have already shown that it is not pro…table to quit when 1 calls for staying, and it is not pro…table to stay when 1 calls for quitting. We will now show that if in some o¤ equilibrium path, player 1 is still active at price p when he should have quit at price p 1 < p; then quitting is a best response (in particular, it is better than winning at p). Let the set of active bidders at p be J = f1; :::; jg : Then, as in equation (10),
(p j+1 ) :::
This means quitting, as his strategy prescribes, is optimal. This completes the proof that the pro…le of strategies de…ned by is an ex-post equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1. E¢ ciency. Without loss of generality, suppose that at a pro…le of signals s the winner is player 1 and that the last to quit is player 2 at price p 2 : Then, we have that
The OEP then tells us that for
we must have
establishing e¢ ciency. 5 Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 4, we prove Lemma A, which in turn uses this simple result.
Lemma 5. If v satis…es the ACC, then for all P N such that j 2 P we have that for any s with
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of P: We already know that the result is true for P = N; so assume it is true for all P 0 with jP 0 j = m + 1: In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that for some P with jP j = m; j 2 P , and some s with jW (s)j > 1 and i 6 = j we had P
In such a case, we must have i 2 P; since otherwise, for P 0 = P [ fig
; contradicting the induction hypothesis. We must also have @v i =@s j > @v h =@s j for all h = 2 P; since otherwise, for some h = 2 P with @v i =@s j @v h =@s j we would have that for
contradicting the induction hypothesis. But then @v i =@s j > @v h =@s j for all h = 2 P; implies that
which contradicts the ACC. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma A. Let us start with the claim that the ACC implies the Equal Increments Condition. For all h 2 P; and i = 2 P; by Lemma 5,
. Keeping i …xed, and adding over all h 2 P; we obtain
We can write the previous equation as
This implies that for some j 2 P; I P rv j > I P rv i as was to be shown. Now assume that v satis…es the CCC, and pick any s with jW (s)j > 1 and any i = 2 P: We must show that there exists j 2 P such that I P rv j > I P rv i : Suppose …rst that there is some k 2 P with k < i and let j be the largest k in P which is still smaller than i: That is, if P = f1; 2; 5g and i = 4; pick j = 2: In order to show that I P rv j > I P rv i ; it will su¢ ce to show that for all k 2 P n fjg ; @v j =@s k @v i =@s k ; since then @v j =@s j > @v i =@s j will make the desired inequality strict. Notice that for all k < i; we have k < j < i; so by the CCC, we have @v j =@s k @v i =@s k : For k > i; we have that the CCC tells us that
Suppose now that for the chosen i there is no k < i in P: For j max k2P P we will show, as before, that for all k 2 P n fjg ; @v j =@s k @v i =@s k : Notice that for all k 2 P n fjg we have i > k > j; so the CCC tells us that
as was to be shown. 
Note that 1 s 0 1 s 1 would imply that there are j 2 P and i = 2 P such that v j (s + I P 1 ) = v i (s + I P 1 ) and that for all " > 0;
for all k 2 P: Taking derivatives with respect to " and evaluating at " = 0; we obtain that for s 0 = s + I P 1 we have jW (s 0 )j > 1; and that I P rv k (s + I P 1 ) I P rv i (s + I P 1 ) for all k 2 P , which contradicts Lemma A, and would therefore conclude the proof. Assume then 1 > s 0
De…ne then P 2 = P n f1g, and
That is, we have "replaced" s by (s 0 1 ; s 1 ) and we will now show that we can't have 2 s 0 2 s 2 : Since 1 > s 0 1 s 1 ; the set on which 2 is de…ned is non-empty, so 2 is well de…ned. If we had 2 s 0 2 s 2 ; we would obtain that there are j 2 P 2 and i = 2 P 2 such that
Taking derivatives with respect to " and evaluating at " = 0; we obtain that for s 0 = (s 0 1 ; s 1 ) + I P 2 2 we have jW (s 0 )j > 1; and that for all k 2 P 2
which contradicts Lemma A, and would therefore conclude the proof.
Fix some l m and de…ne e s = s 0 1 ; :::; s 0 l 1 ; s l ; s l+1 ; :::; s n and P l = P n f1; :::; l 1g : As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for some j 2 P l ; v j (e s) v i (e s) for all i = 2 P l (we have already proved this for l = 1 and l = 2) and de…ne
Again, if we had l s 0 l s l we would obtain that there are j 2 P l and i = 2 P l such that v j (e s + I P l l ) = v i (e s + I P l l ) and that for all " > 0; v k (e s + I P l [ l + "]) < v i (e s + I P l [ l + "]) for all k 2 P l : Taking derivatives with respect to " and evaluating at " = 0; we obtain that for s 0 = e s+I P l l we have jW (s 0 )j > 1; and that I P l rv k (s 0 ) I P l rv i (s 0 ) for all k 2 P l : This contradiction concludes the proof.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 2, we state and prove two simple facts that will help in the proof. If s 00 1 > s 1 ; s 00 i = s i for i = 2; 3 ; W (s ) = f1g and 1; j = 2 W (s 00 ) for j 6 = 1; then there is a such that no e¢ cient equilibrium exists. To see so, set (s ) = (s 00 ) = 1=2, suppose without loss of generality that 3 2 W (s 00 ) (i.e. j = 2). Suppose there is an e¢ cient equilibrium. The quitting price of 2 is irrelevant, so let 3 be the quitting price of player 3 when player 1 is active. We must have, by e¢ ciency, 1 (s 00 1 ) < 3 < 1 (s 1 ) : Since 1 (s 1 ) is a best response, player 1 wants the object at a price of 3 Fact 2. For jP j = 2. Assume the Hypothesis of Theorem 2. If s 00 i > s i for i = 1; 2 ; s 00 3 = s 3 ; W (s ) = f1; 2g and W (s 00 ) = 1; then there is a such that no e¢ cient equilibrium in undominated strategies exists. For a proof, let (s ) = (s 00 ) = 1=2 and let 3 be the quitting price of player 3 when all players are active. Notice that, given the perfect correlation, it is a dominant strategy for players 1 and 2 to bid their valuations, so letting i ( ) denote the bidding strategy of player i in the empty history, we obtain i (s i ) = v j (s ) for i; j = 1; 2: E¢ ciency requires that in state s player 3 quits before 1 or 2; and hence
But in state s 00 player 3 can't be the …rst to quit, so we must have 3 > min i<3 i (s 00 i ) = min i<3 v i (s 00 ) ; so joining this with equation (11) Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that for some s with s i > 0 for all i and jW (s)j > 1 we have s 0 s; s 0 j > s j if and only if j 2 P f1; 2g = W (s) but that max k = 2P v k (s 0 ) > v j (s 0 ) for all j 2 P: Consider now the four cases in which there is only one winner at s and call him player 1; P = f1g : a. P = f1g and v 2 (s 0 ) 6 = v 3 (s 0 ) and v 2 (s) > v 3 (s) : Since v 1 (s) = v 2 (s) ; the regularity assump- Proof of Theorem 5. Pick any s such that jW (s)j > 1 and suppose that s 0 s and s 0 j > s j if and only if j 2 P (s 0 ; s) W (s) : We will now show that max j2P (s 0 ;s) v j (s 0 ) max k = 2P (s 0 ;s) v k (s 0 ). To obtain a contradiction, suppose that for some player i = 2 P (s 0 ; s) we have v i (s 0 ) = max k = 2P (s 0 ;s) v k (s 0 ) > max j2P (s 0 ;s) v j (s 0 ) : In the equilibrium proposed by BI, all players not in P (s 0 ; s) are inactive at p = v j (s) for j 2 P (s 0 ; s) W (s) (either they had quit before p or quit at p) and so can't win the auction when types are s 0 : Since the winners at s 0 are not in P (s 0 ; s) ; the equilibrium can't be e¢ cient and this contradicts Proposition 1 in BI, which asserts that under their assumptions, the proposed equilibrium is e¢ cient.
